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WAR AND PEACE: OF LAW, 
LAWLESSNESS, AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
Antje Mays 
Winthrop University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Laws of war have been carefully defined by individual nations’ 
own codes of law as well as by supranational bodies.  Yet the 
international scene has seen an increasing movement away from 
traditionally declared war toward multinational peacekeeping missions 
geared at containing local conflicts when perceived as potential threats 
to their respective regions’ political stability. While individual nations’ 
laws governing warfare presuppose national sovereignty, the 
multinational nature of peacekeeping scenarios can blur the lines of 
command structures, soldiers’ national loyalties, occupational 
jurisdiction, and raise profound questions as to which countries’ moral 
sense/governmental system is to be the one upheld.  Historically 
increasingly complex international relations have driven increasingly 
detailed internationally drafted guidelines for countries’ interactions 
while at war, yet there are operational, legislative, and moral issues 
arising in multinational peacekeeping situations which these laws do 
not address at all.  The author analyzes three unique peacekeeping 
operations in light of these legislative voids and suggests systematic 
points to consider to the end of protecting the peacekeepers, the 
national interests of the countries involved, operational matters, and 
clearly delineating both the objective and logical boundaries of a given 
multinational peacekeeping mission.  
 
Introduction 
 
War and peace -- at opposite ends of the relational continuum 
and yet inextricably linked: Historically, military presence has been 
utilised for the express purpose of keeping the peace  (or at least the 
status quo of cease-fire)  since the Versailles armistice of 1918.  Do the 
laws of war apply to multinational peacekeeping operations?  Can they?  
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Should they?  What special points of legislation are needed to 
accommodate the unique factors of peacekeeping operations?  The 
purpose of this paper is to show the completeness of the codified laws of 
war in addressing many possible situations as well as to reveal areas 
which are still today completely unaddressed. It traces the development 
of thought on international law and rules of warfare from Classical and 
mediaeval times.  It follows these thoughts' ultimate incorporation in 
modern-day laws and shows how their basic tenets still set the tone of 
today's international relations. Then it summarises Korea, Liberia, and 
the breakup of Yugoslavia – with analysis of the facets of international 
law, rules of warfare, and legal quirks encountered in each scenario.  It 
concludes that we very much need legislation especially tailored to 
peacekeeping, and it explores the operational/technical and legal 
differences between war and peacekeeping and recommends specific 
points which such legislation should accommodate.  To work, any laws 
governing war and peacekeeping must absolutely ensure a universal 
standard of conduct (among the peacekeepers; toward civilians, neutral 
realms, prisoners and wounded from either side of the conflict, toward 
bordering nations' rights, toward violators of any of the established 
international rules of civility), establish predictable lines of command, 
allow for operational flexibility as demanded by developments, enforce 
the peacekeepers' neutrality, ensure the recognition of the contingent-
contributing nations' sovereignty, and protect the human rights of the 
peacekeepers themselves. 
 
Historic Overview 
 
 Since recorded history, warfare has permeated the development 
of civilisations.  While war was viewed as an instrument for self-
protection and/or advancement of one's culture and boundaries, schools 
of thought actually devoted to war in any formal sense grew gradually.  
Although the Romans were known for their cruelty in enslaving 
captured soldiers (or enemy princes) for labor (if they did not execute 
them), they generally practiced civility toward the vanquished civilian 
populations and facilitated mechanisms of bringing these new areas 
into the citizenry of Rome.  And indeed it is the Western tradition of 
thought which has been carried forward to this day, and lines of 
thought on international law can be traced back to Classical times.  
During the Migrations of the Peoples, military advances were typically 
accompanied by pillaging the civilian populations, properties, and 
countryside.  Particularly Ghengis Khan was notorious for his ravages; 
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in the more westerly parts of un-Romanised Northern Europe, the 
Vikings practiced the same indiscriminate killings and pillaging toward 
the civilian populations of their vanquished.  Philosophically one can 
argue that the concepts of international law can be traced back to the 
Classical cradle of Western civilisation.  
 
 Since the days of Greece and Rome, warfare has been (aside 
from conquest tool) considered a subset of the state's right to self-
preservation.  Then the timeframe between the fall of Rome and Italy's 
Renaissance was bridged by the Roman Catholic Church fathers who 
wrote on the human condition and on the chivalric duties of the 
Christian soldier.  This period also gave birth to the concept of “just 
war”.  Subsequently, with the Renaissance’s gradual secularisation of 
the concepts of statehood and crossnational relations along with views 
on human rights and statehood, three fundamental schools of thought 
arose -- today they still form the philosophical basis of international 
law.  Machiavelli believed that the state had an inherent right and need 
to protect itself from the surrounding chaos of other, disorderly, 
civilizations.  He saw war as a function of self-preservation.  According 
to Hugo Grotius, on the other hand, war is a function of international 
law -- to regulate international behavior and the standards by which 
the international society exists.  A universal honor code unspokenly 
defines crossnational codes of conduct.   In the thinking of Hobbes, 
Rousseau, and Kant, man is naturally self-seeking and subjects himself 
to government to avoid the cycle of mutual destruction.   These three 
schools of thought disagree on the level to which an international 
society exists or whether its existence should be acknowledged as a 
conduct-defining code.  However, they do share the natural law concept 
of certain human rights such as individual liberty and safety, the 
concern for the greater good, and a desire for the injection and 
maintenance of civility in relations among states and in instances of 
war – a trait still seen in all recent multinational peacekeeping 
missions and international diplomacy in general.  
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Today’s Laws of War – Their Meaning and Realm 
of Jurisdiction 
 
National Level:  Laws of war, in the purest sense, address national 
defense and govern the nations' conduct while at war.  Our Title 50 
(War and national defense) endeavors to accommodate every possible 
nuance of encounter in which our armed forces might find themselves.  
Yet the law confines itself to justice within the military (at war as well 
as peace), proper conduct toward nations with which the US are at war, 
and to emergency legislation -- it is clearly tailored to the United States 
at war. 
 
International level:  The Hague and Geneva Conventions take great 
care to emphasise human rights and civility in the event of conflict.  
They aim to balance each nation's right to self-defense with the need to 
regulate behavior among nations.  These Conventions, enforceable 
under UN auspices, mandate: 
 
· Protection of immunity from attack for neutral territories 
· Full protection of neutrality for war hospitals, 
humanitarian aid stations, and their personnel 
· Protection of civilians, cultural and private property, and 
merchant vessels 
· Humane treatment of war prisoners 
· Respect for fundamental human rights 
· Fair trials for war crimes 
· Distinctions between belligerents and spies 
 
Origins Of International Law And Laws Of War 
 
Greece and Rome  (900 BC - 476 AD):  Empires were built on and 
maintained through use of military force.  Both Classical Athens and 
Rome originated as city states with the romantic ideal of purity on the 
part their respective citizens.  Within a century however, each had 
progressed to a sense that virtue had to be exported to surrounding 
"barbarians" and that its own population needed to be protected from 
the uncivilised influences of the neighboring peoples of lesser intellect, 
refinement, and social/cultural development. 
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Middle Ages  (476 - 1400 AD):  In the chaos which ensued all over 
Europe following the official fall of the Roman Empire in 476 AD, the 
virtues of literacy, scholarship, and higher thought were upheld by the 
Church fathers who wrote extensively on the condition of man.  St. 
Augustine wrote on the duties of the Christian soldier -- rules which 
spelt out moral conduct and humane treatment of prisoners and 
vanquished.  The character of the Holy Roman Empire was marked by 
the notion that war was a necessary means of protecting the Christian 
lands from he surrounding heathen nations and their corrupting 
influences.  War was also viewed as the papal instrument of spreading 
the Gospel -- the distortion of moral and spiritual conviction and 
crossing into senseless cruelty and plundering found ample 
manifestation during the Crusades.  A double standard governed the 
“rules of warfare” in that Christian nations at war endeavored to abide 
by basic chivalric codes while no concern for any human rights was 
shown toward populations of the non-Christian countries.  In many 
respects this was a period of many extremes, one in which profound 
exploration of human nature, rights, and spirituality existed side by 
side with unchecked cruelty of war that was unrestrained by any rules 
of morality or regard for human rights.  And yet this period also yielded 
three important traditions still found today:  The Pax ecclesiae (Peace 
of God) of 990 outlawed attack on monastic buildings, civilian persons 
and women.  The Treva dei (Truce of God) of 1027 decreed the 
suspension of fighting during holidays and Lent.  And this period gave 
rise to the concept of bello jus (just war): By definition of bello jus a 
country had the moral right and obligation to enforce human rights and 
punish crimes against such beyond its own territorial boundaries.  
Grotius later referred to this idea as the duties of the international 
society to defend rights and regulate crossnational conduct.  And today 
bello jus still forms the basic motivation for every peacekeeping 
operation mounted in our present time. 
 
Machiavelli  (1469-1527):  Niccolo Machiavelli was the product of the 
corrupt fledgling secularisation of government and society during the 
Italian Renaissance.  Having suffered through political intrigues 
between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, the brutal end of the 
Florentine Republic, subsequent imprisonment and torture, he viewed 
war as a means of upholding the rights of one's citizens and as the 
protection of the republican ideal from the surrounding forces of 
lawlessness, chaos, and corruption. 
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Erasmus  (1469-1536):  Desiderius Erasmus, foremost scholar of 
Classics and Church texts, observed the warfare of his day as an 
hypocritical tool by which the papacy sought to expand its boundaries.  
In Erasmus' day wars were waged largely under religious pretext -- he 
thus saw war as contemptible, lawless, senseless, and devoid of all 
civility.  As Machiavelli's Dutch contemporary, Erasmus witnessed the 
same papal corruption and thereto-connected fledgling secular regimes, 
albeit from more of an observer’s stance.  However, his observations of 
contemporaneous politics and his loss of personal acquaintances to 
battles prompted him to be against war at all cost, even if its avoidance 
meant an unjust peace -- he could not bring himself to think of any war 
as "just war", regardless of its cause. 
 
Grotius  (1583-1645):  Although the idea of human rights of safety and 
liberty were not new, Grotius was a key thinker in putting together the 
notion of individual human rights and safety with the moral obligation 
to uphold and defend them across national boundaries.  According to 
Grotius, an international society exists in which there is an overriding 
moral obligation to regulate behavior.  Grotius saw  the normative, 
communicative, and procedural roles of law in arranging and ordering 
society.  War was seen as an international outgrowth of moral 
obligation to uphold certain natural rights -- it was viewed as a 
procedural means to the end of preserving liberty.  Today many 
international lawyers and diplomats still subscribe to this Grotian view 
of law and process -- which is seen in the general climate of the moral 
obligation to uphold and protect human rights whenever a 
peacekeeping operation is mandated or at least when sanctions are 
imposed on a "bully" country. 
 
Hobbes (1588-1679), Rousseau (1712-1778), Kant (1724-1804):  The 
Kantian philosophy is generally labelled as a mix of Freethinking, 
liberal, paired with the Hobbesian survivalist/utilitarian element of 
self-preservation through individual submission to government.  Kant 
was very aware of the need to balance the moral obligation of the 
individual to contribute to the society with allowing a government to 
order the society.  Kant shared the Grotian mindset of individual 
natural rights but was primarily a social philosopher rather than legal 
scholar per se.   He believed that rights could only be upheld within the 
framework of necessary laws ("social contract") -- he favored Rousseau's 
notion that the intrinsically self-seeking humans voluntarily 
subordinate themselves to a government to avoid the mutual 
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destruction so that a moral order could be upheld.   Kant disapproved of 
war personally but viewed it as an at times inevitable means of 
upholding one's citizens'  rights and maintaining social order across 
borders.  As the result of his subscription to Rousseau's "social contract" 
notion, Kant had been labelled as an utopianist/revolutionist in whose 
views are the roots of socialism and despotism as practiced by Hitler 
and Stalin.   Thus the name of Kant fell into disfavor after WWII and 
during the onset of the Cold War. 
 
Declaration of Paris (1856):  This treaty established maritime law 
among the major powers of Europe.  It declared neutrality of neutral 
countries' vessels and seaborne goods.  The treaty also prescribed 
sufficient force to enforce a maritime blockade. 
 
Unspoken Progress…:  Though largely unspoken, the concepts of 
individual rights and responsibilities, as well as an undergirding (albeit 
unspoken) code of civility were widely recognised as established rules of 
warfare. 
 
The War Between the States (1861-1865):  The American Civil War 
has largely been criticised for its large-scale atrocities and excessive 
loss of life.  This war yielded the first official war-crimes trial.  In the 
latter part of the war, the Confederate-administered war-prison camp 
lacked basic life support systems such as sanitation, medicine, and food 
as the result of the financial state of the impoverished Confederate 
government.  The Swiss-German physician in charge of the camp, Major 
Henry Wirz, was entrusted with upholding the unspoken rules of 
civility toward prisoners.  However, in his care, thousands of Union 
prisoners died of malnutrition, diseases, and exposure to the elements.  
He was tried before a military tribunal; his argument of having carried 
out the orders of the prison camp commander was dismissed, as Dr. 
Wirz did have at his disposal the operational autonomy and basic 
supplies to act within the moral boundaries of humane treatment of 
war prisoners.  In the end, he was sentenced to death by hanging -- this 
marked the first official outrage with war atrocities and the first official 
recognition of war crimes as a legal concept of breach with the codes of 
civility and humane treatment of war prisoners.  In many respects this 
was the first trial for “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against 
the laws of war”. 
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Lieber Code (1863):  Francis Lieber, a German-born legal scholar, 
drew up sets of rules of military conduct and they were formally 
integrated as General Order 100 for the United States Army.  The 
Prussian Army code of 1870 was based on Lieber's ideas and proved 
thorough and comprehensive in the Franco-Prussian War.  The code 
endeavored to anticipate all possible scenarios of the battlefield, 
marshal law, espionage, desertion, encounters with civilians, 
merchants, prisoners of war, wounded, armistice, capitulation, and 
humanitarian issues.  It condemned use of poison, enslavement as 
retaliation, and violation of personal dignity.  In many respects it was 
the catalyst of European interest in internationally binding agreements 
governing war and wartime conduct.                      
 
Geneva Convention of 1864:  As the result of the Crimean War and 
the Franco-Austrian War in which wounded were not properly cared 
for, the international community agreed to convene in Geneva to 
establish protection for Red Cross personnel and neutrality for war 
hospitals. 
 
St. Petersburg Agreement (1868):  As the result of having observed 
often haphazard shooting of strategic insignificance, military leaders 
agreed to ban bullet use -- this marked the first international treaty 
geared to banning weapons use. 
 
Hague Conventions  (1899, 1907, 1954): 
 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes  (Hague I, 
1899 –  updated 1907) 
 
 Convention with respect to the laws and customs of war 
on land   (Hague II, 1899) 
 
Convention relative to the opening of hostilities  (Hague 
III,  1907) 
 
Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on 
land    (Hague IV, 1907) Convention respecting the rights 
and  duties of neutral powers and persons in case of 
war on  land   (Hague V, 1907) 
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Convention respecting the protection of cultural property  
(Hague, 1954) 
 
 The rights of belligerents were declared not to be unlimited.  
Inhumane treatments such as arbitrary arrests and detention, 
harassment of civilians, seizing or destruction of private property, 
maltreatment of war prisoners, encroachments on personal dignity, 
genocide were outlawed, and the Convention for Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes was drawn up along with the creation of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration which still fulfills its function at The 
Hague.  Neutral territories cannot aid or hinder either side of the 
conflict and must keep the conflict from entering their neutral territory.  
On the other side, neutral territories have the right to be left out of the 
conflict and their territory to be respected by surrounding belligerents.  
These conventions also provided for the protection of cultural property 
(1954) by codifying their safety from attack whenever these culturally 
significant buildings are not used for military purposes. 
 
 The Hague Conventions drew many of its undergirding 
principles from the Lieber Code and, in turn, influenced the 
philosophical framework and organisation of the League of Nations 
which followed the end of the First World War. 
 
Geneva Conventions (1864, 1949, 1977 Protocols):  The 1864 
Convention for the Amelioration if the Wounded in Time of War 
established clear guidelines governing the safety of hospital and 
humanitarian facilities: 
 
• Immunity of war hospitals and personnel (thus 
protecting them from capture or attack while treating 
sick soldiers); 
• Impartial acceptance and treatment of soldiers from 
either side of the conflict; 
•  Protection of civilians aiding the war wounded; 
•  International recognition of the Red Cross as a symbol 
bindingly identifying war hospitals and aid stations 
covered by this agreement. 
 
 This was the first convention spelling out the duties of neutrality 
in war.  1928: Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods 
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of warfare.  1949: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. 
 
(Geneva I) 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea       
 
 (Geneva II) 
Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war   
 
 (Geneva III) 
Convention relative to Crimes Against Humanity 
Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in  
time of war  
 
 (Geneva IV)  
 This convention reiterated principles previously codified 
by Lieber and in the Hague Conventions.  These actions were 
outlawed : 
 
· Deportation of groups or persons 
· Genocide (specially adopted by UN General 
Assembly 1948: Convention on the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide) 
· Taking hostages 
· Encroachments on personal dignity 
· Torture 
· Collective punishments when only one specific 
person should be punished for a given crime 
· Unwarranted destruction of property, especially 
civilian property 
· Discrimination on account of race, political 
persuasion, nationality, religion. 
 
 The 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts 
(Protocol II), extended the Conventions' protection to the parties of an 
internal conflict such as in civil war and guerrilla soldiers.  This 
measure was the response to insurrections and colonial independence 
wars -- atrocities particularly in Vietnam had caused worldwide concern 
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over the question of jurisdiction or applicability of any laws in dealing 
with such atrocities.  This aspect of applicability to guerrilla warfare 
raises internationally examined issues at every occurrence of any  
(especially internal) conflict:  Do these protocols apply to conflict-ridden 
nations who are not signatories to them?  At which point should the 
international community step in? 
 
Treaty of Versailles (1919):  Following the 1918 armistice, this treaty 
was designed to hold the vanquished Germans to reparations to the 
Allies.  More importantly, the treaty stipulated German disarmament 
and the Allied Occupation forces’ initial presence was designed to quell 
the potential revival of German military aggression.  Both of these 
elements of disarmament and military presence to keep an aggressor in 
check were later adopted by the UN Charter. 
 
League of Nations  (1920 -1939):  Following the atrocities of World 
War I, US President Woodrow Wilson spearheaded the League of 
Nations -- a supranational organisation formed by the Allied nations 
and headquartered in Geneva.   Its purpose was the maintenance of 
peace and prevention of war by means of collective condemnation of 
would-be-belligerents.  The League's Covenant stipulated the immunity 
of its officials and buildings, called for arms reduction, and peaceful 
means of resolving conflicts among the League's member nations.   The 
basic tenets followed the principles of the Hague Conventions and were 
incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations which followed in 
1945.  The League was however discredited after failing to prevent 
Germany's (and the rising Hitler's) disregard of the Versailles Treaty 
and forcible reclamation of the Rhineland, Japanese invasion of China's 
Manchuria, and Italy's overrunning of Ethiopia.  In addition, the US 
had, during the interwar years, reverted to its tradition of choosing 
isolation from world affairs, leaving no one to effectively enforce the 
League's cause.   In the end it was disbanded in 1939. 
 
United Nations (1945-  ):  The United Nations, headquartered in New 
York City, was founded 1945 in response to the atrocities and war 
crimes of World War II, and as an endeavor to carry forward the initial 
mission of its predecessor.  After two wars, the United States decided 
that their involvement was necessary to maintain an impartial 
involvement in world affairs and did not again withdraw from such 
supranational endeavors of preserving peace.    The Charter of the 
United Nations declares the UN's primary mission as the preservation 
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of peace and the deterrence against use or threat of use of force upon 
any other territory.  Its approach to conflict contains three stages: 
 
1. Pacific settlement of disputes (thus eliminating any 
perceived need for hostilities and legitimate reasons 
for conflict) 
2. Collective security (thereby deterring conflict-ridden 
regions from escalating:  the "collective show of 
strength" is designed to tell the belligerents that the 
international military strength is too much for them 
to withstand) 
3. Disarmament (banning weapons shipments, depriving 
the belligerent of military supplies, thereby "starving" 
the arsenals and ultimately the conflict). 
 
Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
1. Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their 
destruction  (1972) 
 
2. Convention on the prohibition of military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques  
(1977) 
 
 
Nuremberg War Crime Trials:  The Allied tribunal established in 
Nuremberg  was chartered to try key individuals for crimes against 
these three major areas of international law: 
 
1. Crimes against peace (by waging a war of aggression) 
2. War crimes  (i.e. violations of laws and customs of war 
as set forth in the Hague Conventions) 
3. Crimes against humanity  (such as genocide, murder, 
humiliation, encroachment on the dignity of civilians). 
 
     The precedent set by the Nuremberg War Crime Trials is that the 
practice emphasised the punishment and sentencing of individual 
perpetrators, the treatment of specific persons as criminals rather than 
transferring this "criminal" status to the entire nation. 
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NATO:  The North American Treaty Organisation was founded 1949 as 
a safety measure to balance power with the Soviet Union and its 
satellite East European countries which it absorbed in all senses but 
formal government.  Its members included the Western Allies and later 
West Germany. NATO’s basic premise of deterrence against Soviet 
expansion further west into devastated Europe was that any attack 
against one constituted attack against all.  The end result was the 
threat of US retaliation against any Soviet attacks on a NATO member 
country – this strategy served effectively against further expansion.  
With the end of the Cold War ushered in by the 1989 fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the subsequent collapse of communism across Eastern 
Europe, the role NATO has been changing from Cold War watchdog to a 
European alliance styled more after supranational political (rather than 
military) organisations.   It was NATO which decided to stage the 
peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia after its beginning civil war in 
1991, as the unrest was viewed as a security threat for the greater part 
of Central Europe. 
 
Vienna Conventions and Subsequent Protocols: 
Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations (1961) 
Vienna Convention on consular relations (1963) 
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties(1969) 
 
Currently Existing Laws of War – Their Scope:  At the national 
level laws of war address national defense and govern the nation's 
conduct while at war.  Their scope also includes civilian rights and 
duties under martial law and define the soldier’s duty of service and 
loyalty to his country.  At the international level war-related legislation 
follows the Grotian spirit of international law:  Regulation of behavior 
across lines of state, respect for the natural human rights of the 
individual, insistence upon humanity in instances of armed conflict, 
enforceable mandates prescribing the treatment of various groups who 
are caught up in the effects of war. 
 
Legal Issues Motivating Peacekeeping Missions 
 
1. Crimes against peace 
2. Crimes against humanity 
3. Crimes against laws of war as set forth in the 
Conventions. 
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Peacekeeping Examples – In The Name Of 
Conflict Containment 
 
Korea 
 
Synopsis/chronology:  Although this was technically not a 
peacekeeping operation, its use of collective strength did prove an 
example of deterring crimes against peace and against a nation’s right 
to self-determination:    Following World War II, the United States and 
Soviet Union convened in Moscow  in 1945 to settle the matter of 
establishing a unified postwar Korean government.  The North had 
come under Soviet military jurisdiction, was not permitted to 
participate in the negotiations with the UN and US-spearheaded 
initiative,  and established a Soviet-style government. Meanwhile the 
South held elections and established a Western-style government under 
the supervision of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea.  In 1950 
the Russians staged an invasion south of the 38th parallel dividing 
these two states, and China soon joined the Russian cause.  The UN 
Security Council quickly resolved that UN members should resist the 
communist invasion.  Heavy casualties, especially for US troops, did not 
result in wresting a unified Korean republic from communist control.  
Instead, the dividing line settled in its original place at the 38th 
parallel, and US troops are stationed in South Korea  (with “UN 
blessing”) to this day – to discourage the Soviet Union or Communist 
China from repeated invasion. 
 
Legal Issues and Technicalities: 
 
1. A nation’s right to self-determination and self-
defense.  Invasion was a direct violation of this right. 
2. Crimes against peace.  Invasion also violated peaceful 
coexistence. 
3. Collective security:  Show of collective strength on the 
part of the UN members (as a token of the 
international community’s commitment to the rights 
of nations to self-determination) led to negotiations 
ending the Korean War and formal recognition of each 
Korean area’s autonomy. 
4. Deterrence:  In conjunction with collective security, 
the continued presence of US troops under UN 
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auspices keeps potential aggressors at bay and has so 
far successfully prevented a repeated invasion from 
the North. 
5. Quirks in jurisdiction:  China protested against the 
UN resolution, arguing on the premise that it had no 
representation on the United Nations; the Soviets’ 
boycott of the meetings rendered them unable to veto 
the resolution.   The question of whether a nation can 
be held to standards to which it chose not subordinate 
itself later resurfaced in form of countries seeking 
exemption on the premise that they were not 
signatories to a given set of Conventions. 
 
     Although this operation was not officially labelled as a peacekeeping 
operation per se  (and even though the UN members did enter in 
decidedly on the side of South Korea), its beginnings did have all the 
trappings of  a call to bello jus, supranational commitment to upholding 
nations’ and people’s rights to safety and liberty, desire to effect and 
maintain peace, and the question of the international laws’ jurisdiction 
over the nations involved in a given conflict. 
 
Liberia 
 
Synopsis/chronology:  Liberia enjoyed a tradition of relative 
prosperity, republican ideals and affinity to the United States since 
World War II, UN participation and active involvement in international 
affairs and African regional issues.  However, economic declines and 
financial hardships brought on by declining export prices of its rubber 
and iron ore bred the conditions for a coup d’etat in 1980. General 
Samuel Doe took control of Liberia under marshal law following the 
president’s murder.  A new constitution was instituted in 1986; promise 
of return to civilian government was followed by elections after which 
the coup leader Samuel Doe was elected as president.   He was put 
down by the rebellious Krahn, Gio, and Mano tribes whose fighting 
ushered in a brutal civil war which raged from 1989 until an official 
cease-fire of August 1996.   Present-day endeavors to quell sprouts 
pocket fighting is finding unique expression in ECOWAS’ confiscation of 
weapons from the various factions.   
 
 Rivals’ contention for power prolonged the struggle – over the 
course of six years, Liberia’s society, economy, and infrastructure 
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disintegrated completely.  West Africa’s ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
was augmented by UN observers.  The governmental and societal 
structures, however, were dissolving so rapidly that all order completely 
collapsed and along with it any regard for human rights. 
 
 Peacekeepers’ and observers’ lives were gravely endangered, and 
Tanzania withdrew its contingent – both for frustration with the 
stalemate and out of concern for the safety of its troops.    Rebuilding is 
slowed by the massive population displacement. Many children were 
abused, traumatised, abandoned, have become orphaned, and have 
become addicted to drugs.   Medical facilities are substandard and 
inaccessible, slowing the process of proper care for the vast needy 
population. 
 
Legal and Technical Complications 
 
Chaos:  The civil war was so bloody and the hostilities so 
uncontrollable that: 
1. peacekeepers' lives were endangered and their 
neutrality was not respected 
2. the entire social structure and civilised infrastructure 
collapsed 
3. ultimately, peacekeepers were withdrawn due to the 
excessive dangers and the lack of progress toward 
peace achievement 
 
Crimes against humanity:  Aside from the indigenous traditional 
practice of female mutilation, the civil war has catalysed numerous 
instances of mutilation of babies, massacres, taking hostages, beating, 
rape, torture, killing, maiming, dismemberment, beheading, 
cannibalising of civilians by faction leaders. 
 
4. Crimes against individual liberty in form of arbitrary 
arrest and detention. 
5. Crimes against protection of private property not 
involved in the conflict:  Arbitrary intrusions into 
homes, capricious arrests, pillaging, looting, theft, 
confiscation and destruction of property. 
6. Denial of fair public trial:  The civil war has also 
resulted in the collapse of the judicial system.  
Capricious justice is carried out by faction leaders – 
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“confessions” to guilt and/or innocence are solicited by 
means of torturing the defendants. 
7. Crimes against the established rules of warfare:  
Prison conditions are unsanitary and life-threatening.  
People are captured and held prisoner without actual 
charges.  Prisoners are mistreated – mentally abused 
in form of threatened executions, physically abused in 
form of rape, beatings,  torture, and starvation. 
8. Violation of neutral rights  paired with  crimes 
against humanity:   UN convoys for medical and 
humanitarian relief are repeatedly attacked by 
fighters from all sides of the conflict.  This hinders aid 
to the wounded soldiers and displaced civilians, and 
this situation violates the neutral rights of the 
humanitarian and medical relief workers. 
9. Violation of established rules of warfare and crimes 
against humanity on peacekeepers’ part!   ECOMOG 
soldiers detained groups of people, including civilians, 
in arbitrary capriciousness. 
 
The Break-Up Of Yugoslavia 
 
Synopsis:  In many respects, this conflict has its roots in the region’s 
mediaeval conquest and oppression by the Ottoman Turks.  
Historically, at times of autonomy, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
been separate kingdoms respectively – until their administrative 
combination under Yugoslavia following the end of World War I.  
Following World War II and the  Soviet expansion of its political 
influence of communist/military rule, Yugoslavia became a Soviet 
satellite. Under Communism’s Tito and subsequent strong centralised 
government, the various ethnic groups had lived together as neighbors 
peacefully.  The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently of the 
Iron Curtain in 1990, so hailed by romanticists around the world as the 
beginning of a new era of peace, also led to the demise of the 
Communist regime in Yugoslavia.  With that, a power vacuum ensued 
and the power struggle began.    
 
 Ethnic propaganda fueled Bosnian resentment over the Serbian 
"cultural code" which defined the leadership of Yugoslavia at large.  
Isolated animosities gradually escalated into a full-blown civil war from 
1991.  This conflict, mainly between Bosnians and Serbs, raged on until 
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1996.  With it, the world saw indiscriminate imprisonment, torture, 
rape, and mass murder of civilians, the destruction of beautiful 
architectural jewels and cultural and historical treasures.  And the 
international community wondered with concern whether the ethnic 
conflict would spread into neighboring Hungary, Albania, and/or 
Macedonia – especially after Macedonia’s 1991 secession from 
Yugoslavia. 
 
Legal Complications and Issues:  Tragedy, crimes against peace, 
war atrocities, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, crimes 
against the protection of cultural and historic properties, the potential 
to draw neighboring nations into the conflict -- they all formed a grisly 
backdrop for the legal scenario against which the international 
community must sift through the events.  As in the Nuremberg 
tradition, individuals are being tried for their alleged crimes; however, 
blurred evidence is making actual convictions less likely than originally 
hoped and anticipated. 
 
1. UN sanctions were declared as well as arms blockades 
-- this posed the question as to whether the 
international community's UN-Charter-mandated 
right to "disarm via cutting off weapons supply" 
outweighed the Hague-mandated individual nations' 
right to self-defense under international law. 
2. Collective security:  NATO planes enforced the no-fly 
zone and bombed Serbian forces who were attacking a 
Bosnian enclave. Dayton Agreements -- based on the 
UN-suggested "collective force".  The US fighter 
arsenal in Dayton, OH was shown to the chief leaders 
of the Yugoslav conflict as an unspoken warning of 
force to be unleashed on the conflict if no agreement 
were reached.  Soon after, the Dayton Accords were 
signed in March 1996.  Whether the cease-fire lasts 
remains to be seen.  Aside from murky legal 
complications of international jurisdiction or the 
applicability of laws of war by custom, the former 
Yugoslavia has tragically lost many of its historic 
treasures, social structure, and civil infrastructure.  
Moreover, massive antigovernment demonstrations in 
Bosnia and Croatia (in reaction to both new countries’ 
leaders’ autocratic measures)  show the fragility of the 
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fledgling rebuilding efforts in their newness – while a 
concerned international community looks on uneasily. 
3. The absolute neutrality of the peacekeepers was 
questioned when the Western world emphasised 
Serbian atrocities against Bosnian Muslims -- The 
Serbs felt that the peacekeepers were ignoring 
Bosnian Muslim atrocities against the Serbs.   It did 
seem that the peacekeepers’ sympathies  (and those of 
world opinion)  tilted toward the Bosnian Muslims, 
even if that was unintentional.  If this is true, this 
would be an incident of taking sides, which cannot be 
allowed if peacekeeping is to remain a neutral conflict 
containment tool as we know it. 
4. The entire definition of neutrality of the 
peacekeepers.  By definition, their neutrality extends 
to their duty to keep the conflict from spreading 
beyond its existing boundaries.  By definition, they 
are compelled to an absolute, obligatory impartiality.  
Is this the Geneva-mandated definition of neutrality?  
Is it implicitly transferred to the peacekeepers 
without being expressly stated verbatim? Is this an 
as-of-yet unspoken code?  If yes, then neutrality for 
peacekeepers must be defined and codified. 
5. Confusing command jurisdiction – individual nations 
under UN command?  Respect for peacekeepers’ 
sovereignty?  A UN-mandated peacekeeping mission 
was deployed in Macedonia – partially in response to 
an assassination attempt on its president (and 
maintain internal stability), partially also to keep the 
Yugoslavian civil war and its ethnic passions from 
spreading into Macedonia..  In its course, US Army 
medic Michael New, in his patriotism of serving in the 
US forces, refused in 1993 to cast off the US insignia 
to wear the UN emblem and blue helmet.  In January 
1994 he was court-martialed in Germany, discharged 
dishonorably on bad-conduct charges, and disqualified 
from receiving veterans’ benefits.  This incident over 
command loyalties sent shockwaves of scandal around 
the world.    Previously, US Congress had introduced 
a bill which would render US soldiers wearing of UN 
insignia illegal, and Michael New gained support and 
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sympathy among conservative legislators and 
military/international law scholars.  Loyalty disputes 
between the US and UN were not new to Macedonia:  
The placement of American troops under often 
incompetent UN command had endangered US 
soldiers’ lives, procedurally tied their hands, made 
them appear incompetent themselves, and rendered 
the US the laughingstock of the world.  Images of US 
soldiers being dragged through the streets of Somalia 
and their fear of Haitian thugs (due to absence of any 
UN-approved rights to self defense!!) set a 
detrimental precedent for the safety of peacekeepers.   
6. Sovereignty or World Government?  More 
importantly, the legislative implications of this 
measure are of historic proportions:  Presidential 
decision directive 13 (PDD-13) (drafted by the Council 
on Foreign Relations in 1993) aims to place US troops 
under UN command.  This would turn the UN 
Secretary General into the technical commander-in-
chief of worldwide armed forces (which would, of 
course, be deployed under peacekeeping tenets) and 
relinquish the United States’ control over its own 
soldiers to a multinational administrative body.    
Where would be the end of possibilities encouraged by 
such a precedent?  Would this set the stage for the 
end of individual nations’ right to self-determination 
and sovereignty as we know it? 
7. Of morality, principle, and constitution…  We must 
never forget a nation's moral obligation to protect its 
own citizens (civilian and military alike) from 
betrayal to foreign governments and crimes against 
their freedom and personal dignity. And a government 
has the absolute constitutional responsibility to 
uphold its nation's right to self-determination and 
self-defense. 
8. Lesson learnt from the Michael New incident?  
Interestingly, the US troops now being sent to Zaire 
for humanitarian assistance with the refugees' return 
to Rwanda are being expressly placed specifically 
under US command. 
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War and Peacekeeping – Differences and 
Similarities 
 
Technically, the state of war, the state of militarily expressed 
antagonism between two or more nations, forms the backdrop of war 
laws' applicability. War begins and a nation enters in on a very clearly 
decided "side" of the conflict.  Peacekeeping, by contrast, is typically 
initiated by entities neutral to an existing conflict -- forces are deployed 
by NATO, UN, or other regional organizations such as OAU, ECOWAS, 
or OAS -- for the purpose of intervening in a civil war and/or 
safeguarding a delicately obtained cease-fire.   None of the peacekeeper 
countries are themselves at war  (neither with each other nor with the 
region to which they were deployed), a scenario beginning to hint at the 
need for laws beyond the traditional laws of war.   Moreover, the 
contingents forming the peacekeeping group become an entity which 
poses proven temptation to transcend national command lines and 
raises the question of continued recognition for the sovereignty of the 
individual nations whose troops serve on these multinational 
peacekeeping missions.   
 
 Despite these major differences, peacekeeping scenarios also 
share many of the physical elements of war:  
 
1. prisoners 
2. casualties 
3. movement of troops 
4. aspects of objectives and strategies 
5. equipment 
6. humanitarian relief efforts.    
 
Applicability Of War-Related Laws To 
Peacekeeping Scenarios 
 
Context:  Typically, peacekeeping operations are called to action in 
events of an internal conflict.  Philosophically this step is a last-resort 
attempt by a concerned international community to prevent a 
simmering conflict from escalating into a full-blown war of 
international proportions.  This step is taken upon recognition of having 
missed the opportunity to resolve the dispute peacefully:  either in 
hopes of keeping a conflict from flaming out of control or in a more 
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pragmatic pursuit of desiring to impose an internationally mandated 
calming-down.  This was the case following the cease-fire ending the 
Korean War, Rwanda, Liberia, and the civil war which ultimately 
caused the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. 
 
Applicability:  In light of the fact that peacekeepers are deployed to 
zones of armed conflict, it is logical then that the rules of warfare under 
customary international law still apply to all operational aspects  the 
conflict. 
 
Jurisdiction:   All persons on the scene must absolutely be held to the 
moral precepts outlined in the Hague and Geneva Conventions.  This 
includes all combatants on each side of the conflict, and the 
peacekeepers themselves must be held to the standards of peace, 
humanity and rules of warfare. 
 
Distinctions:  While the combatants are also subject to the rules of 
warfare in terms of war prisoners, treatment of civilians, and neutral 
zones and persons, and cultural and historic properties, peacekeepers 
have a multifaceted additional burden:   Though endowed with the 
privilege of immunity from attack by combatants from either side of the 
conflict, they must reciprocate unconditionally this gesture of neutrality 
by refraining from taking sides.  They may defend themselves against 
either side’s belligerents, within parameters which have yet to be 
clearly defined. 
 
Peacekeeping Scenarios – Typical Pitfalls 
 
 Quagmires of jurisdiction and legality for the conflicted regions:   
While the 1949 Geneva Conventions state rather clearly the rights and 
duties of nations at war, they are after all written for relations between 
nations at war.    Out of concern over internal anti-colonial movements 
and insurrections (for which the 1949 Conventions offered no legally 
binding jurisdiction), the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
extended these obligations and boundaries of civility as codified in the 
war-pertinent laws and treaties to insurgents internal to a given 
country.  This was done in the hopes of affording some sort of protection 
to those who are not part of the conflict:  Civilians, nations of neutral 
territories, merchants, humanitarian and hospital workers.     
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Quirks and Ambiguities:  Those wishing to be exempt from the rules 
of civility, especially wagers of an warfare internal to territorially 
defined country, might point to the Geneva Conventions describing at 
length the obligations in the event of an international (rather than 
internal) conflict.  But no, they say, this is not an international dispute, 
therefore the Geneva rules do not apply…  Insurgent-types such as 
German terrorists, Basques, IRA fighters are not governed by any 
international laws of war, whereas territorial gains on the part of 
insurgents in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the former Yugoslavia 
brought about war-like scenarios of territorial advances, prisoners, 
casualties, civilians caught up in the conflict, wounded, and the needs of 
these wounded.  Precedent seems to indicate that the decision on 
whether any of the Hague and Geneva Conventions (and 1977 
Protocols) can apply is governed by the question of whether any of the 
internal combatants have seized and gained control of territory 
formerly belonging to other parts of the country (as the territorial 
advances in Bosnia and Serbia illustrated most vividly). 
 
Jurisdiction over signatories only?  For invaders: The question 
remains whether the belligerents themselves are nationals of signatory 
nation -- under which premise they could technically argue exemption 
from the Geneva Conventions’ jurisdiction.    This problem was 
encountered in Iraq when the torturous and inhumane treatment of 
prisoners of war, in terms of ethics and technicality, violated the 
Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of war prisoners.  Iraq 
argued on the premise of not being a signatory of the Geneva 
Conventions.  For guerrillas: This aspect of applicability to guerrilla 
warfare  and insurrection with resulting warlike scenarios and 
territorial gains raises questions of legal applicability:  If the conflict-
ridden country is not a signatory to the 1977 Protocols, a region home to 
an internal conflict may argue that these laws set forth in these 
protocols do not apply at all – despite evidence of all the trappings of 
insurrection against an existing central government, territorial 
advances and conquest, and needs of wounded and civilian populations. 
 
For the Peacekeepers Themselves: 
 
1. What if any peacekeepers’ home nations are not 
signatory to any of the Conventions?  Can they be 
permitted to enforce principles to which their own 
home countries chose not to subordinate themselves? 
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2. Fuzzy command structures, lack of clarity as to which 
nation’s soldiers are under which  nation’s command.  
( Command loyalty issues ( attempted legislation to 
subordinate US troops to UN command ( implications 
for the future sovereignty of nations? 
3. Temptation to enter the conflict on either side – this 
could divide the peacekeepers. 
4. Violation of the peacekeepers’ neutrality rights by 
either side’s belligerents. 
5. Safety concerns for peacekeepers and humanitarian 
relief workers. 
6. For the international community:  Where does the 
international community’s “just war” -mandated right 
to interfere with a conflict-ridden region end and 
become a one-world police state of capricious 
arbitration? 
  
 
How Well Do The Current Laws Of War Address 
Peacekeeping Needs? 
 
Regarding the utilitarian elements of warfare, the laws of war 
provide excellent scope and umbrella legislation.   They leave nothing to 
the imagination in the context of propriety in declaration of war and 
conduct of hostilities, respect for human rights, neutrality (of neutral 
countries, of war hospitals, immunity of humanitarian relief stations), 
special status for civilians, diplomats, citizens of countries /regions not 
involved in the conflict, treatment of war prisoners.    Above all, we 
must remember that these laws “by the international community for 
the international community” are conventions which govern the conduct 
of the individual countries which are themselves at war.   The 
peacekeepers are “guests” to the conflict, despite their role as “neutrally 
appointed benevolent mediator-at-arms”. 
 
Peacekeeping Laws – Points Which They Should 
Address 
 
     Pitfalls unique to peacekeeping need special laws to allow the 
peacekeepers to avoid having their hands tied by the very laws of war 
on which basis they are deployed in the first place:  Special laws for 
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peacekeeping operations should accommodate the two components of 
moral issues and legal technicalities and operations: 
 
Moral Issues and Legal Technicalities:  In the spirit of natural law 
and international law, laws of war are not isolated from universal codes 
of morality or humanity.  Peacekeeping missions are fielded from the 
heart of this very sense of moral obligation to humanity.   Multinational 
peacekeeping is beleaguered with the issues of participants' 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, command structures, service on foreign soil, 
international conduct.  The laws of war have been expanded for setting 
the tone of peacekeeping operations. At best these laws (codified in form 
of The Hague and Geneva Conventions, the UN Charter, specific status-
of-forces agreements, case-specific resolutions) implicitly address the 
wartime scenarios encountered by peacekeepers. Yet while the 
“mechanics” of warfare have been afforded ample consideration, there 
are several completely unaddressed major areas that are routinely 
encountered by peacekeepers: 
 
1. National loyalties: In the situation of joint forces 
formed by several countries’ peacekeeping 
contingents, the question of which countries’ soldiers 
serve under which country’s command.  
2. Respect for the sovereignty of the nations whose 
troops are participating in a given peacekeeping 
effort.   From a moral and ethical perspective, there is 
great need for delineating the distinction between 
serving one's own country and serving a multinational 
"ad hoc committee-at-arms".   We are reminded by 
Michael New’s symbolic refusal to wear the United 
Nations' blue beret that, especially in the United 
States, our troops end up in peacekeeping operations 
when they are "drafted" into them by means of their 
units' assignment to interventions -- after our soldiers 
voluntarily and trustingly signed up to serve in our 
military.  Where does the obligation to one's country 
end and fall under the shadow of something else?   
(Certainly the morality of the presidential motion to 
subject US troops to UN command and the therefrom-
resulting betrayal of the soldiers by their own country 
must be seriously called into question)  In this spirit, 
any international laws specifically designed to 
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address multinational peacekeeping operations must 
never undermine the sovereignty of the nations whose 
soldiers serve as peacekeepers, accommodate the fact 
that the intervening nations are not  themselves at 
war,  and allow for sufficient authority to ensure the 
peacekeepers' safety. 
3. Ensuring a universal standard of conduct; among the 
contingents themselves, toward wounded from the 
region to which the peacekeepers were deployed, 
toward prisoners from either side of the conflict, 
violators of the peacekeeper-established neutral zones 
from either side, toward spies who would thwart the 
peacekeeping efforts. 
4. Strict neutrality: Although this is generally 
understood as an underlying unspoken premise:  
peacekeepers absolutely must never take sides in the 
conflict.  The peacekeepers’ neutrality must be 
enforced, if necessary.  Taking up sympathy with 
either side of the conflict would: skew the “natural 
balance of power” within the conflict itself by thereby 
artificially adding more troops and materiel to either 
side of the conflict, internally divide the peacekeepers 
and destroy the impact of their team effort, give 
international license to the conflict’s escalation 
beyond its established boundaries (which is a most 
dangerous proposition, as it could breed the seeds of a 
world war). 
5. Issue:  Peacekeepers' conduct and "diplomatic 
immunity" as neutral entities.  Peacekeepers are 
deployed as neutral to the conflict.  Thus they enjoy 
the rights and privileges of neutrality:  protection 
from attack by either side of the conflict and the right 
to self-defense against attack from either side.   They 
are also held to the duties of neutrality:  Refraining 
from involvement with either side, impartiality in 
involvement with all sides of the conflict.  The 
standards of behavior as set forth in the laws of war 
must also have jurisdiction over the peacekeepers.   
As they are likely to be called into at least some 
measure of military engagement, it must be clear that 
peacekeepers are also not allowed to commit crimes 
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against peace, against humanity, the civility-
prescribing rules of warfare. 
6. Peacekeepers’ right to self-defense:  Peacekeepers 
must be allowed to defend themselves from attacks 
from either side of the conflict to which they were sent 
as mediators-at-arms. 
7. Conflicted region’s right to self-defense: There must 
be universal legislation to address the matter of the 
conflict-ridden area’s right to obtain weapons and 
supplies from outside sources who are its normal 
allies.  This aspect must carefully weigh the conflict 
suffering region’s right to self-defense and self-
preservation against the regional and international 
needs of conflict containment. 
8. Conscientious objection:  There must be a clause 
allowing for conscientious objection for those whose 
deployment to a given conflict-ridden region would 
compromise their national loyalties. 
9. The question of signatories:  Should peacekeepers be 
chosen only from countries that are actually signatory 
to the Conventions and/or Protocols that a given 
peacekeeping mission is meant to uphold?  Or should 
the peacekeeping contingents be chosen based upon 
military competence and the home countries’ moral 
values?  If the conflict-ridden region is not signatory 
to the Conventions and/or Protocols, can they be held 
to them?    The line between international obligation 
to a universal code of humanitarian morality and 
outright “one-world police” is very thin indeed. 
 
Operations:  Peacekeeping legislation should define peacekeeping 
missions and provide safeguards against the indefinite prolonging of a 
peacekeeping group’s involvement in a given conflict beyond reason. 
 
· Assessment of the conflict (regional or internal) 
· Its moral implications 
· Its likelihood to be resolved without intervention 
· Its impact on greater/ surrounding region and its 
security 
· Its impact on global security and international 
balance of power 
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· Define the need: 
· What are the needs of the region?   Economic 
stability?  Internal stability? 
· An internal agreement?  Ethnic mediation?  A 
regional agreement? 
· Define a checklist of criteria/ points on which to 
decide whether or not to intervene. 
· Borrow from business practices and treat 
administration of peacekeeping in the manner of a 
businesslike strategic plan with thereto-attached 
action plan and timeline. 
Þ this requires anticipation of “things going 
wrong”. 
Þ this requires command-level flexibility in 
planning and operations to respond 
appropriately to the realities encountered in 
the course of the peacekeeping mission. 
Þ this also requires some measure of autonomy 
at the local level to allow the peacekeepers 
sufficient “on-site” procedural flexibility to 
allow the multinational participants to respond 
to unanticipated command situations and as 
necessitated by the course of events.   
· Define the method. 
· Define the objective. 
· What should the peacekeeping contingent accomplish 
to meet identified needs? 
· Honestly assess whether the objective is feasible? 
· What are the criteria for determining feasibility of a 
potential objective? 
· What are the maximum limits of conflict-resulting 
danger and escalation to which troops should be 
exposed before an intervention is declared futile? 
(Otherwise, neutrality, immunity, credibility, and 
effectiveness would break down. 
· Define systematically measurable success criteria. 
· As an umbrella goal to all of these above-mentioned 
points:  Define the parameters of the United Nations, 
as it is the legal enforcer of international law 
Carefully thought-out precautions must be taken to 
define the relationship between autonomous and 
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sovereign nations and the supranational body – after 
all the UN is at once legislative (Conventions), 
executive (peacekeepers), and judicial (World Court).  
Nevertheless it is not a mega-nation with the right to 
overstep the national command structures of any 
multinational intervention forces under its umbrella. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What is needed is nothing short of Vienna Congress of sorts:   
We need to delineate the role of the UN and similar regional 
supranational leagues, define the peacekeepers’ rights and duties, 
identify the legal as well as operational distinctions between war and 
peacekeeping, compile a systematic checklist of typical scenarios and 
special issues likely to confront the peacekeepers, draw up international 
agreements forcing participants to define their peacekeeping missions’ 
objectives and limitations beforehand, and facilitate appropriate 
measures for the international community to take in the event of a 
failed peacekeeping endeavor.  Only then can an international 
consensus on morality be consistently enforced, the peacekeepers’ lives 
protected, and sovereignty of nations preserved. 
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